So his agile mind worked, spinning
its familiar web of possibilities and contingencies and fine
distinctions. General Gordon, he was convinced, might be hemmed
in, but he was not surrounded. Surely, it was the duty of the
Government to take no rash step, but to consider and to inquire,
and, when it acted, to act upon reasonable conviction. And then,
there was another question. If it was true--and he believed it
was true--that General Gordon's line of retreat was open, why did
not General Gordon use it?
Perhaps he might be unable to withdraw the Egyptian garrison, but
it was not for the sake of the Egyptian garrison that the relief
expedition was proposed; it was simply and solely to secure the
personal safety of General Gordon. And General Gordon had it in
his power to secure his personal safety himself; and he refused
to do so; he lingered on in Khartoum, deliberately, wilfully, in
defiance of the obvious wishes of his superiors. Oh! it was
perfectly clear what General Gordon was doing: he was trying to
force the hand of the English Government. He was hoping that if
he only remained long enough at Khartoum, he would oblige the
English Government to send an army into the Sudan which should
smash up the Mahdi. That, then, was General Gordon's calculation!
Well, General Gordon would learn that he had made a mistake.
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