But the great bulk of the
party, and the Cabinet, with Mr. Gladstone at their head,
preferred a middle course. Realising the impracticality of an
immediate withdrawal, they were nevertheless determined to remain
in Egypt not a moment longer than was necessary, and, in the
meantime, to interfere as little as possible in Egyptian affairs.
From a campaign in the Sudan conducted by an English army they
were altogether averse. If, therefore, the English army was not
to be used, and the Egyptian army was not fit to be used
against the Mahdi, it followed that any attempt to reconquer the
Sudan must be abandoned; the remaining Egyptian troops must be
withdrawn, and in future military operations must be limited to
those of a strictly defensive kind. Such was the decision of the
English Government. Their determination was strengthened by two
considerations: in the first place, they saw that the Mahdi's
rebellion was largely a nationalist movement, directed against an
alien power, and, in the second place, the policy of withdrawal
from the Sudan was the policy of their own representative in
Egypt, Sir Evelyn Baring, who had lately been appointed Consul-
General at Cairo. There was only one serious obstacle in the
way--
the attitude of the Pashas at the head of the Egyptian
Government.
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