To the first man the succession of the species would be as
incomprehensible as the resurrection of the dead is to us.
Thought is different from motion, perception from impact: the
individuality of a mind is hardly consistent with the divisibility of an
extended substance; or its volition, that is, its power of originating
motion, with the inertness which cleaves to every portion of matter
which our observation or our experiments can reach. These distinctions
lead us to an immaterial principle: at least, they do this: they so
negative the mechanical properties of matter, in the constitution of a
sentient, still more of a rational, being, that no argument drawn from
the properties can be of any great weight in opposition to other
reasons, when the question respects the changes of which such: a nature
is capable, or the manner in which these changes am effected. Whatever
thought be, or whatever it depend upon the regular experience of sleep
makes one thing concerning it certain, that it can be completely
suspended, and completely restored.
If any one find it too great a strain upon his thoughts to admit the
notion of a substance strictly immaterial, that is, from which extension
and solidity are excluded, he can find no difficulty in allowing, that a
particle as small as a particle of light, minuter than all conceivable
dimensions, may just as easily be the depositary, the organ, and the
vehicle of consciousness as the congeries of animal substance which
forms a human body, or the human brain; that, being so, it may transfer
a proper identity to whatever shall hereafter be united to it; may be
safe amidst the destruction of its integuments; may connect the natural
with the spiritual, the corruptible with the glorified body.
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