It is not necessary for our purpose, that these
propositions be capable of proof, or even that, by arguments drawn from
the light of nature, they can be made out to be probable; it is enough
that we are able to say concerning them, that they are not so violently
improbable, so contradictory to what we already believe of the divine
power and character, that either the propositions themselves, or facts
strictly connected with the propositions (and therefore no further
improbable than they are improbable), ought to be rejected at first
sight, and to be rejected by whatever strength or complication of
evidence they be attested.
This is the prejudication we would resist. For to this length does a
modern objection to miracles go, viz., that no human testimony can in
any case render them credible. I think the reflection above stated,
that, if there be a revelation, there must be miracles, and that, under
the circumstances in which the human species are placed, a revelation is
not improbable, or not to any great degree, to be a fair answer to the
whole objection.
But since it is an objection which stands in the very threshold our
argument, and, if admitted, is a bar to every proof, and to all future
reasoning upon the subject, it may be necessary, before we proceed
further, to examine the principle upon which it professes to be founded;
which principle is concisely this, That it is contrary to experience
that a miracle should be true, but not contrary to experience that
testimony should be false.
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