Blount's chapters on the administrations of Taft, Wright and Smith
embody one prolonged plaint to the effect that the organization of
the constabulary was premature, and that after the war proper ended,
the last smouldering embers of armed and organized insurrection should
have been stamped out, and the brigandage which had existed in the
Philippines for centuries should have been dealt with, by the United
States army rather than by the constabulary.
Even if it were true that the army could have rendered more effective
service to this end than could have been expected at the outset from
a newly organized body of Filipino soldiers, the argument against the
organization and use of the constabulary would in my opinion have
been by no means conclusive. It is our declared policy to prepare
the Filipinos to establish and maintain a stable government of their
own. The proper exercise of police powers is obviously necessary to
such an end.
From the outset we have sacrificed efficiency in order that our wards
might gain practical experience, and might demonstrate their ability,
or lack of ability, to perform necessary governmental functions. Does
any one cognizant of the situation doubt for a moment that provincial
and municipal affairs in the Philippine Islands would to-day be more
efficiently administered if provincial and municipal officers were
appointed instead of being elected? Is any one so foolish as to imagine
that the sanitary regeneration of the islands would not have progressed
much more rapidly had highly trained American health officers been used
in place of many of the badly educated and comparatively inexperienced
Filipino physicians whose services have been utilized?
Nevertheless, in the concrete case under discussion I dissent from
the claim that more satisfactory results could have been obtained by
the use of American troops.
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