It has
seemed to me that the reasons why General Merritt should never have
made it, and why General Otis could not possibly have renewed it,
should be fully set forth.
On September 7, 1898, General Otis had cabled to Washington that
Admiral Dewey and he considered conditions critical, and that
the number of armed Insurgents in the city was large and rapidly
increasing. He stated that on the 8th he would send a notification
to Aguinaldo that unless the latter's troops were withdrawn beyond
the line of the suburbs of the cry before September 15 he would be
obliged to resort to forcible action and that the United States would
hold Aguinaldo responsible for any unfortunate consequences which
might ensue.
Aguinaldo still hoped to obtain recognition of his government by the
United States, but did not consider such recognition probable, and
pushed preparations to attack if a favorable opportunity should offer.
Before occupying ourselves with these preparations, let us briefly
review the results of our investigations as to Insurgent cooeperation
with the American forces up to this time.
Taylor has made the following excellent summary of the case:--
"Up to this time Aguinaldo had continued a desultory warfare with the
Spanish troops in Manila.
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