If Caesar was really as well
disposed as Balbus represented, then the senatorial party, himself
included, had acted like a set of madmen. It might be assumed, therefore,
that Caesar was as meanly ambitious, as selfish, as revolutionary as their
fears had represented him, and that his mildness was merely affectation.
But what then? Cicero wished for himself to be on the right side, but also
to be on the safe side. Pompey's was the right side, the side, that is,
which, for his own sake, he would prefer to see victorious. But was
Pompey's the safe side? or rather, would it be safe to go against him? The
necessity for decision was drawing closer. If Pompey and the consuls went
abroad, all loyal senators would be expected to follow them, and to stay
behind would be held treason. Italy was with Caesar; but the East, with
its treasures, its fleets, its millions of men, this was Pompey's, heart
and soul. The sea was Pompey's. Caesar might win for the moment, but
Pompey might win in the long run. The situation was most perplexing.
Before the fall of Corfinium, Cicero had poured himself out upon it to his
friend. "My connections, personal and political," he said, "attach me to
Pompey. If I stay behind, I desert my noble and admirable companions, and
I fall into the power of a man whom I know not how far I can trust.
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