A council of officers was held on the receipt of this unwelcome
information. It was thought unlikely that the Eburones would rise by
themselves. It was probable enough, therefore, that the conspiracy was
more extensive. Cotta, who was second in command, was of opinion that it
would be rash and wrong to leave the camp without Caesar's orders. They
had abundant provisions. They could hold their own lines against any force
which the Germans could bring upon them, and help would not be long in
reaching them. It would be preposterous to take so grave a step on the
advice of an enemy. Sabinus unfortunately thought differently. He had been
over-cautious in Brittany, though he had afterward redeemed his fault.
Caesar, he persuaded himself, had left the country; each commander
therefore must act on his own responsibility. The story told by Ambiorix
was likely in itself. The Germans were known to be furious at the passage
of the Rhine, the destruction of Ariovistus, and their other defeats. Gaul
resented the loss of its independence. Ambiorix was acting like a true
friend, and it would be madness to refuse his offer. Two days' march would
bring them to their friends. If the alarm was false, they could return. If
there was to be a general insurrection, the legions could not be too
speedily brought together.
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